Giannis Balabanidis
PhD in Political Science

The Renovationist Eurocommunist Left: An “Anomaly” of the Post-Dictatorship Period

The KKE Interior was a distinctive political phenomenon of the post-dictatorship period. It was a communist party whose ideological influence far exceeded its electoral performance and which formed part of a broader European current, Eurocommunism, alongside the Italian, French and Spanish Communist parties.

The party that emerged from the split within the KKE following the dramatic 12th Plenum of 1968 bore from the outset the imprint of the problems that had confronted the international communist movement since 1956, in the post-Stalinist era: how could a communist party remain committed to the democratic principle, open and tolerant towards the expression of minority views, adapted to national circumstances, and at the same time critical of the Soviet experience? The condemnation of the repression of the Prague Spring was one of the founding moments of what came to be known as the “renovationist” Greek Left.

The domestic circumstances of the dictatorship were equally decisive in shaping its political profile. For the KKE Interior, the central objective was to construct the broadest possible anti-dictatorship front, including even sections of the bourgeoisie or the Right as allies, with democratisation as its ultimate horizon. This was the substance of the National Anti-Dictatorship Democratic Unity (EADE). Within this framework, the party also favoured making use of the Junta’s policy of “liberalisation”, on the grounds that any relaxation of the regime would facilitate the formation of resistance forces. The Polytechnic uprising called this strategy into question. Like the orthodox KKE—and, in a comparable way, the French Communist Party (PCF) during May 1968—the KKE Interior viewed with suspicion the forces of the “revolutionary Left” that advocated direct confrontation, although it would ultimately participate actively in this major act of resistance.

During the period of democratic transition, the KKE Interior presented itself as a party that was more national than class-based. The text “The Goals of the Nation” proclaimed national unity as essential for consolidating the democratic prospect. The party established a moderate yet modern profile, attracting in particular the population of urban centres, women, young people, and social groups with relatively high levels of education and income.

It kept its distance both from the populist radicalism of PASOK and from the romantic radicalism of the New Left. The communists of the “renewal” believed that anti-dictatorship unity had to be protected at all costs, while at the same time seeking recognition within the communist family. They demonstrated a unifying spirit by running jointly with the KKE and EDA—the United Left—in the 1974 elections, although the electoral results were poor.

After the disappointing performance in the 1977 elections, it was recognised that EADE placed excessive emphasis on anti-dictatorship unity. From the left, it was argued that EADE amounted to an undermining of the party’s communist character; from the right, that the party, in its futile attempt to secure the “endorsement” of the USSR, had been slow to develop an autonomous and broader identity, favouring strategies such as the Common Programme between Communists and Socialists in France.

By 1981, the principal objective had become the “defeat of the Right”. Yet the hegemony of “populist” PASOK and the orthodox KKE’s dominance in the struggle over the communist legacy confined the renovationist Left to the role of a “moral conscience” of the PASOK government. In the polarised landscape of post-dictatorship democracy, the KKE Interior had opted for a “dialogical” political culture based on broader consensus, Europeanism and an autonomous civil society—an approach that would remain a minority position.

Moving into the 1980s, attention turned towards Perestroika, with hopes for an overall renewal of the communist project. It was therefore no coincidence that, in 1985, an existential debate began over the party’s future, giving rise to three possible paths: the leadership’s orientation, associated with Leonidas Kyrkos, towards the party’s “transformation” into a non-communist party; the Banias platform, which sought an “upgrading” of its communist identity; and the “third view”, associated with Filinis, which advocated a new political formation with a radical character and close links to social movements. The victory of the transformation strategy eventually led to the creation of the Greek Left (EAR), while the dissenters formed the KKE Interior–Renovationist Left.

The founding declaration of EAR, issued in the spring of 1987, advocated a “pluralist multiparty socialism with freedom and self-management”, an equally pluralist social subject in which class identity would be enriched by the new social movements and civil society, a decisive pro-European orientation, and a “left-wing, democratic modernisation”.

The creation of EAR represented the Greek step in the broader trajectory followed by most Eurocommunist parties towards decommunisation. However, it made possible a rapprochement with the KKE, which in 1989 was reflected in the Joint Conclusion of the two parties, the prelude to the Coalition of the Left and Progress. EAR was the major programmatic beneficiary: the changes taking place in the USSR were recognised as “revolutionary”, as was the renewal dynamic of the new social movements; economic planning was to coexist with the market; statism was rejected; and Europe was proclaimed the “common home of the peoples”. Nevertheless, participation in coalition governments amid an institutional crisis, together with the failure of Perestroika, ultimately led to the dismantling of the Coalition, although many—particularly younger—figures from the renovationist tendency within the KKE remained within it.

The KKE Interior’s distinctive position in post-dictatorship Greece stemmed from a number of ideological innovations, rooted both in the circumstances of its formation and in its adherence to the international Eurocommunist current. Crucial among these was its emancipation from the USSR; its rejection of Soviet interventionism—from Czechoslovakia to Afghanistan and Poland in 1979–1980; and its condemnation of the persecution of dissidents, although its critical stance generally took care not to cross over into “anti-Sovietism”.

The distancing from the Soviet model meant, conversely, that communist renewal reassessed the value of liberal democracy, parliamentarianism and political pluralism, elevating the expansion of “bourgeois” rights and freedoms into a fundamental element of its political identity. Indeed, as early as the “counter-draft Constitution” it presented in 1975, it advanced pioneering proposals for progressive institutional modernisation, many of them deriving from the radical momentum of 1968: democratic control over the mass media; an enforceable right to employment and social security, healthcare and leisure time; recognition of maternity; full equality between men and women; as well as the establishment of a second tier of local government, university autonomy, and an expansion of Parliament’s powers at the expense of the President of the Republic. Continuing this tradition, EAR promoted new fields of rights, including pluralism in the mass media, the separation of Church and state, and the establishment of a guaranteed minimum income.

The picture was more ambivalent in the field of internal party democracy. Although the First Congress of 1976 introduced freedom of opinion for members and minorities, it nevertheless retained democratic centralism and the prohibition of groups or factions. It was only with the formation of EAR that internal party tendencies were permitted.

Alongside political pluralism stood social and ideological pluralism. The renovationist Left sought to overcome class reductionism by transforming the party into an expression of a constellation of political subjects, within which new repertoires of collective action, civil society, the democratisation of party life and forms of participation could find their place. Additionally, the Party’s youth organisation, EKON Rigas Feraios, consistently served as a laboratory for the formation of a youthful communist identity that incorporated contemporary Western cultural currents and a strong post-materialist agenda—including feminism, ecology and rights. Pluralism was also theoretical. Following developments in Western Marxism and the intellectual elaborations of its affiliate Communist parties in Western Europe, particularly the Italian PCI, the renovationist Left sought to shed dogmatism and theoretical impoverishment and to develop its own form of renovationist Marxism. This was facilitated not only by party institutions such as the Centre for Marxist Studies, but also by a multitude of intellectual forums that were autonomous from the party while remaining in dialogue with it, such as Synchrona Themata, Anti, Theseis and Politis.

Finally, a major and distinctive characteristic of this political space was Europeanism. The decisive turn occurred during the dictatorship, when the Soviet policy of maintaining uninterrupted relations with the regime stood in stark contrast to the freezing of the Greece–EEC Association Agreement. In the Declaration of its First Congress, now under conditions of democracy, the KKE Interior recognised Europe both as a guarantor of democracy and as a new “field of class struggle”. Participation in the EEC constituted a fundamental dividing line within the Greek post-dictatorship political system. As an “anomaly” within the Greek Left, the KKE Interior positioned itself in favour of integration. Indeed, it went so far as to advocate deepening the European project in a federal direction, echoing the position advanced by the Italian Eurocommunists.